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In the construction of charging piles, traditional gas stations possess significant advantages in terms of regional and financial resources. The transformation of gas stations into “refueling+charging” integrated gas stations relies on charging pile manufacturers and government, involving coordination issues with them. This paper aims to propose a joint coordination contract based on the principles of cost-sharing and revenue-sharing. The objective is to achieve systemic coordination among integrated gas stations, charging pile manufacturers, and the government, optimizing the planning of the quantity of charging piles and charging prices.

We have constructed an operational system model based on the Stackelberg game between charging pile manufacturers, integrated gas stations, and government. We have analyzed the optimal quantity of charging piles and charging prices under the impact of government subsidy policies in both decentralized and centralized operation scenarios. Additionally, we have proposed a joint coordination contract based on cost-sharing and revenue-sharing to coordinate this tripartite operational system.

The study reveals that, under simple cooperative contracts, the optimal decision does not yield maximum profits for the operational system due to the “double-marginal effect”. However, under the impact of the joint coordination contract, which combines cost-sharing and revenue-sharing as proposed in this paper, gas stations will consider the charging pile manufacturer’s costs and government subsidies when determining the optimal quantity and price. This not only achieves system coordination but also results in Pareto improvement in the benefits of all system members by adjusting contract parameters.

The value of this research lies in its insights into operational strategies for the construction of charging piles for electric vehicles. By analyzing optimal decisions under different contract arrangements, the study provides guidance to relevant stakeholders, enabling the operational system to achieve greater efficiency and coordination and realize more extensive Pareto improvements. Furthermore, it extends the application of coordination contract theory in the context of charging pile construction and operations.

Innovation quality is a critical component of enterprise innovation. Prior research primarily focuses on company-level and external policy-level factors that affect innovation quality, while ignoring social-level factors. Based on institutional isomorphism theory, this study examines how the innovation quality of three-dimensional institutional equivalence, which is an important and unique reference group for firms to follow the “law of imitation of close preference”, affects the likelihood of firms' innovation quality.

This study conducts firm random effects and industry/year fixed effects models using China's listed companies from 2002 to 2021.

This study finds that compared with the innovation quality of its other industry, community, or network peers, the innovation quality of three-dimensional institutional equivalence has a greater impact on firm innovation quality. Furthermore, technological intensity significantly increases the effect of three-dimensional institutional equivalence on focal company innovation quality, while financing constraints significantly attenuate this effect. Additionally, when there is no institutional equivalent, the innovation quality of network, industry, and community peers has significant positive effects on enterprise innovation quality. Heterogeneity analysis also indicates that, under the conditions of non-state-owned enterprises, a low regional legal environment, or low regional factor market development, three-dimensional institutional equivalence contributes significantly to firm innovation quality.

This study focuses on the effect of three-dimensional institutional equivalence on Chinese enterprises' innovation quality. Nonetheless, research samples from other countries are not considered in this study.

This study explores the impact of three-dimensional institutional equivalence on firm innovation quality within a systematic theoretical framework and incorporates firm attributes into this framework.