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Article
Publication date: 18 June 2024

Manoj Kumar, Neha Gahlawat, Sumanjeet Singh, Pankaj Chamola, Devkant Kala and Minakshi Paliwal

This research aims to investigate the showrooming phenomenon in the context of the evolving omnichannel shopping landscape, which seamlessly integrates both physical and online…

Abstract

Purpose

This research aims to investigate the showrooming phenomenon in the context of the evolving omnichannel shopping landscape, which seamlessly integrates both physical and online retail channels. Showrooming, wherein customers browse products in physical stores but ultimately purchase from online competitors, poses a potential threat to the job security and job satisfaction of sales staff in brick-and-mortar (B&M) stores. To address this issue, this study explores the relationship between showrooming, self-efficacy, sales performance, job insecurity and job satisfaction of sales staff, using the job demands-resources (JDR-R) model as a theoretical framework.

Design/methodology/approach

This research employs quantitative research methods and gathers data from 219 sales staff working in Indian retail stores. Structural equation modeling is used to test the proposed hypotheses.

Findings

The results indicate that showrooming is associated with a decrease in the self-efficacy, sales performance and job satisfaction of sales staff. Furthermore, the result indicates that showrooming is positively associated with increased job insecurity among the sales staff.

Originality/value

This study offers valuable contributions to existing literature and offers insights for both retailers and salespeople regarding the potential repercussions of showrooming. It also suggests coping strategies to address the challenges posed by showrooming and the behavior of showroomers.

Details

American Journal of Business, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1935-5181

Keywords

Article
Publication date: 26 June 2024

Junxia Yuan, Renhuai Liu and Yuanyang Zou

A new model for two-sided platforms is presented, incorporating both the original business and an expanded (new) business. Previous studies have neglected the impact of technology…

Abstract

Purpose

A new model for two-sided platforms is presented, incorporating both the original business and an expanded (new) business. Previous studies have neglected the impact of technology R & D on the new business aspect of two-sided platforms. This study addresses this gap by examining the technology R & D effect on the new business while also considering the congestion effect on the original business. It investigates the optimal pricing and user scales for both the original and new businesses. Additionally, the profits of the original business, the new business, and the overall two-sided platform are analyzed.

Design/methodology/approach

Previous studies have overlooked the technology R & D effect on the new business aspect of two-sided platforms. Therefore, this study focuses on examining the technology R & D effect on the new business. Additionally, the congestion effect on the original business is considered. To determine the optimal prices for both sides of the original and new businesses, a game sequence model is introduced.

Findings

The optimal price on the service buyers (defined b side) of new business increases only with regard to technology R & D effect on b side of new business increasing. The optimal price on b side of new business is equal to half of the b-side R & D effect. The optimal profit of original business decreases with regard to the technology R & D effect of new business and cross-market network effect on the services provider (defined s side) between original business and new business increasing, respectively. To gain optimal profit of two-sided platform, the two-sided platform adopts some strategies to improve the congestion.

Originality/value

A new two-sided platform model is stated, in which the technology R & D effect is embraced. The expanded business scenario of two-sided platform is considered, that is, the two-sided platform has one business firstly and a new business is developed or improved of two-sided platform. To solve the prices strategy of original business and new business, a game sequence of the original business and new business is presented.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

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