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Besieged by the distance learning revolution, many senior university and college administrators are asking: how can traditional classroom teaching be modified in order to keep pace with the rapidly evolving high‐tech marketplace for higher education? The Faculty of Social Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel launched a three‐year pilot project to use multimedia and distance learning tools to improve classroom teaching. There are initial signs of success for this unique project that knits together powerful new multimedia infrastructure, WWW course sites, and electronic “smart classrooms.” This article proposes nine political guidelines for university administrators who seek to advance similar pilots but who also fear that faculty members will oppose such revolutionary projects.

Can we import the high‐performance team theory developed in the private sector into the public sector in order to improve the success rates of information technology (IT) projects? This article proposes that public organizations can create effective workgroups (weaker than the private sector’s high‐performance teams but stronger than the weak committees that typically manage public IT projects) in order to improve the chances of concluding IT projects successfully. Two remarkably similar Internet projects in Israel’s Ministry of Trade and Commerce and the Jerusalem Municipality are described, compared, and analyzed. The first adopted the workgroup project model and was concluded successfully. The second adopted the committee project model and ran into problems and delays. Lessons are gleaned from these case studies on how to staff, structure, and supervise public IT workgroups.

Develops a “politics‐first” theoretical framework to explain why, how, and when innovative IT projects are implemented successfully in public organizations. Explains how individuals who share a technological interest find each other in issue‐networks. Describes why and how the interests of technologists, bureaucrats, and politicians converge to a point where a coalition with a concrete project agenda emerges. Argues that, frequently, more than one coalition emerges from a single issue‐network and describes how these coalitions compete against each other to institutionalize new dominant designs. Discusses the reasons why some coalitions win while others lose. Provides examples based on innovative national and municipal IT projects in Australia, China, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the UK, and the USA.

Argues that leaders with extensive backgrounds in organizational politics are more likely than technology‐focused leaders to complete their information technology projects successfully. Describes how successful technological leaders in the public sector manage their projects, mainly upwards and outwards, and tailor their technical visions to the day‐to‐day reality of their organizations. Compares the evolution and fate of two information technology projects, one managed by a technology‐oriented scientist (success) and the other by a politics‐driven bureaucrat (failure). Proposes that senior decision makers can hone the political skills of their technological leaders by training them on the “soft” skills of management and helping them balance the skill sets of their teams. Suggests how to change current incentive systems in order to encourage technological leaders to politick their projects to success.

The paper examines two discourses of bereavement that crystallized simultaneously in Israel as the third millennium began. One is “the economic discourse of bereavement,” with which official organizations dealing with bereavement sought to “free themselves” from the state's directives on entitlement to compensation. Army widows argued that compensation should not depend on their refraining from remarriage, while bereaved parents demanded it would not be contingent on a means test. They urge for liberation from “role demands” and for presenting entitlement to compensation as entitlement to personal rehabilitation, without using it to support pro-establishment behavior or unending interactions with establishment supervision. Those claims express the linkage of bereavement to globalization and individuation, and the desire to rebel against the republican equation conditioning entitlement to welfare on “proper” establishment-compliant behavior. A second discourse is the “hierarchy of bereavement discourse” – which was placed on the agenda together with the first one, and by the same organizations. Unlike the economic discourse, this one acted to replicate the monopoly held by families of IDF dead in the Israeli pantheon, with attempts to bring into it a group of families of civilian bereavement (families of terror victims). The discourse relies on purely republican underpinnings, complying with the spirit of the local–national period. Exploring the two discourses, that were promoted simultaneously by the same agents, assists an analysis of the Israeli discourse of bereavement that results in its definition as “glocal.” This transpires from a review of the literature showing that – even in the face of globalization processes – national–local foundations remained stable. The paper first engages with the concept of glocalization, the ethos of republican citizenship, and, as a facet of it, the identification of social policy as an agent of the social hierarchy, as well as changes in citizenship during globalization. The second section reviews the status of bereaved families, and the central discourses they have promoted in Israeli society. The third and major part contains an analysis of both discourses – the economic discourse of bereavement, and the hierarchy of bereavement discourse. Finally, we attempt to analyze and explain how apparently antithetical discourses took shape in tandem, drawing on the term “glocalism” and the impact of citizenship models.

How can we account for patterns of mobilization undertaken by ethnic movements? What leads ethnic collectives to shift between mobilization strategies? Addressing the general lack of attention in the ethnic conflict literature to the diverse political strategies employed by ethnic minorities – particularly those in democratic and semi-democratic contexts, this chapter accounts for mobilization as developing along an institutional spectrum of ethnic contention. I argue that the internal dynamics of ethnic movements shape patterns of mobilization. Utilizing literature from new institutionalism and employing the approach advanced by the study of contentious politics, ethnic movements are theorized as developing through the interplay of three causal mechanisms, which combine to form processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. The process of deinstitutionalization is explored through the case of the mobilization of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, tracing the development of the three causal mechanisms and their influence on the collective’s mobilization pattern. The chapter concludes by considering the range of movements that can be explored along the institutional spectrum.

The extent to which opposition movements engaged in contention are able to broaden the scope of their struggle has garnered the attention of scholars of ethnic conflict, social movements, and contentious politics alike. The ability to broaden the scope of contention is known as scale shift. It is of paramount importance in cases of ethnonationalist movements, given the nature of their claims and the oppressive and repressive sociopolitical setting in which they are often situated. Our study advances social movement theory by developing a more nuanced understanding of the process by analyzing rich historical evidence from a failed attempt of scale shift: the case of Israeli-Arab 1976 Land Day. Utilizing Tarrow and McAdam's (2003) model, we analyze scale shift and its constituent mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion as they operate across different political opportunity structures and encounter different levels and types of repression. Based on our findings, we modify the model by highlighting a set of intermediary mechanisms, namely individualization, segmentation, resource restriction, exclusion, co-optation, defection, and internalization/externalization. We argue that these intermediary mechanisms largely account for the failure of scale shift in the specific repressive settings of the Arab minority in Israel.

On 1 April 1978, the Israeli peace movement burst into world consciousness when an estimated 25,000 Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv to urge the administration of Prime Minister Menachem Begin to continue peace negotiations with Egypt. A grassroots group called Peace Now is credited with organizing and leading that demonstration. Today, the “peace camp” refers to left‐wing political parties and organizations that hold dovish positions on the Arab‐Israeli conflict and the Palestinian issue. While some figures in the Labor Party view themselves as the peace movement's natural leader, political parties further to the left like the Citizens Rights Movement (CRM) and Mapam are more dovish. In the last 10 years, many grassroots peace organizations have, like Peace Now, formed outside the political party system, with the goal of influencing public opinion and eventually having an impact on policy makers. Peace Now is still the largest, most visible and influential of those organizations.