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This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/09593849710166147. When citing the article, please cite: Lucas D. Introna, Edgar A. Whitley, (1997), “Against method-ism”, Information Technology & People, Vol. 10 Iss 1 pp. 31 - 45.

This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/EUM0000000000387. When citing the article, please cite: Lucas D. Introna, (1991), “The Impact of Information Technology on Logistics”, International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, Vol. 21 Iss: 5, pp. 32 - 37.

The purpose is to indicate the potential impact, be it positive or negative, of information technology on the effective management of the logistics function. This is achieved by defining the concepts of logistics, management, information and technology to create a base of understanding. A framework is then suggested to guide the integration of information technology effectively into the logistic function. In conclusion the important aspect of building commitment as a key success factor in the effective management of information technology in logistics is examined.

Provides a critique of teleological information systems development methodologies. Argues that these methodologies lead to “dead” systems that make very little sense to their users. Presents the work of the architect Christopher Alexander as an example from another discipline of ateleological development. Using principles gleaned from his work, presents some ideas of how information systems development may become more ateleological. Narrative, metaphor and myth seem to provide some indicators of how such ateleological development may be achieved. Acknowledges that there is no simple answer to the issues involved, except for the conviction that more precision or automation in teleological development methodologies would not do much to solve the enormous problems occurring in practice today.

Presents a critical review of the role of laboratory experiments in information systems research. In an attempt to highlight the issues raised by laboratory experiments, presents a thought experiment of such an experiment. The thought experiment indicates the problem of distinguishing between that which is done to complete the task and that which is done to complete the requirements of the experiment. Further develops an understanding of this problem by presenting the work of Heidegger, Merleau‐Ponty and others. From this discussion, shows that people develop styles for coping in the world that do not allow them to “break up” the world into discrete objects, events, persons, and so forth. Based on this discussion, argues that it is impossible for the observer as well as the observed to know whether their style of coping in the experiment is a style of coping with the world or a style of coping with the requirements and constraints of the experiment. From this discussion, concludes that most laboratory experiments in information systems research have neither internal nor external validity. As such, they should be actively discouraged.

Provides a critique of method‐ism ‐ the view that methodology is necessary and sufficient for information systems’ development success; method‐ism presupposes also that systems developers understand the value of methodology and will prefer to work with it rather than without it. Argues, against method‐ism, that method flows from understanding, and not the reverse. Hence method cannot be a substitute for understanding. Discusses the way in which humans tend to interact with the world by means of ready‐to‐hand tools, using the ideas of Heidegger and Ihde. Shows that tools are used only if available (ready‐to‐hand) in the world of doing. If a methodology is not ready‐to‐hand, it will break down and be ignored in the pragmatics of getting the job done. Presents a number of arguments why methodologies by design will tend to break down (not be ready‐to‐hand) and hence be discarded.

This question of community has always been a preoccupation for the human sciences and, indeed, is a practical concern for us everyday humans in our variety ways of being. As such a preoccupation with community traverses vast territories of intellectual discourse in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and so forth. Recent developments in continental philosophy, innovations in information and communication technology and the emergence of “virtual” communities afford an opportunity to reconsider the meaning of community in what is believed to be a rather fundamental way. Virtual communities are often critiqued for being “thin” and “shallow” lacking the depth that local proximity in face‐to‐face communities brings. It is suggested that such a critique privileges a certain view of community premised upon shared values, or shared concerns, embedded in local situated face‐to‐face interaction and practices. The paper agues that such a view of community, based on categorical and physical proximity or sameness, can be problematised by a notion of community that is based on the ethical proximity of the stranger, the otherness of the Other.

The paper draws upon Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida.

The paper demonstrates that community premised upon a categorical and physical proximity can be problematised by a conception of community based upon the ethical proximity of the stranger – the otherness of the Other. In developing this notion of community, the paper argues that communities always face an insider/outsider problematic that mirrors Levinas' tension between ethics and justice. Furthermore, the paper suggests that the continual working out of this problem, our ethical concern, is differently constituted in virtual communities and face‐to‐face communities. In particular, the paper draws attention to the importance of the encounter with the stranger in virtual environments.

Contributes to debates on community by developing an ethical and political philosophy through which a shared sense of community can be rethought through the primacy of the Other.

Rejects arguments that ICANN is engaged in mere technical management or technical co‐ordination, rather than political governance. Examines ICANN’s structure through the lens of Aristotle’s philosophy, stating Aristotle was not democratic in a modern sense. Proclaims Aristotle saw representative structures as an important check on élite and economic power, also as a source of valuable competing perspective.

This study aims to elaborate the picture of the relationships between information and power by examining how expert power appears in the characterizations of gatekeeping presented in the research literature.

This study uses conceptual analysis for examining how expert power is constitutive of the construct of gatekeeper and how people subject to the influence of gatekeeping trust or challenge the expert power attributed to gatekeepers. The study draws on the analysis of 40 key studies on the above issues.

Researchers have mainly constructed the gatekeepers' expert power in terms of superior knowledge and skills applicable to a specific domain, coupled with an ability to control or facilitate access to information. The gatekeeper's expert power has been approached as a contextual factor that facilitates rather than controls access to information. The power relationships between the gatekeepers and those subject to gatekeeping vary contextually, depending on the extent to which the latter have access to alternative sources of information. The findings highlight the need to elaborate the construct of gatekeeping by rethinking its relevance in the networked information environments where the traditional picture of gatekeepers controlling access to information sources is eroding.

As the study focuses on how expert power figures in gatekeeping, no attention is devoted to the role of social power of other types, for example, reward power and referent power.

The study pioneers by providing an in-depth analysis of the nature of expert power as a constituent of gatekeeping.