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The purpose of this paper was to investigate the relationships among the intellectual ability of artificial intelligence (AI), cognitive emotional processes and the positive and negative reactions of human members. The authors also examined the moderating role of AI status in teams.

The authors designed an experiment and recruited 120 subjects who were randomly distributed into one of three groups classified by the upper, middle and lower organization levels of AI in the team. The findings in this study were derived from subjects’ self-reports and their performance in the experiment.

Regardless of the position held by AI, human members believed that its intelligence level is positively correlated with dependence behavior. However, when the AI and human members are at the same level, the higher the intelligence of AI, the more likely it is that its direct interaction with team members will lead to conflicts.

This paper only focuses on human–AI harmony in transactional work in hybrid teams in enterprises. As AI applications permeate, it should be considered whether the findings can be extended to a broader range of AI usage scenarios.

These results are helpful for understanding how to improve team performance in light of the fact that team members have introduced AI into their enterprises in large quantities.

This study contributes to the literature on how the intelligence level of AI affects the positive and negative behaviors of human members in hybrid teams. The study also innovatively introduces “status” into hybrid organizations.

The present study aims to assess the potential effects of intellectual capital (IC) and disclosure of firms' affiliate transactions on contractual costs (CC).

The statistical population of the study includes 768 firm-year observations listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012–2017. According to Pulic's model, the authors divide IC into three components, such as human capital (HC), relational capital and structural capital (SC). CC is also measured by utilising two variables of board cash compensation and unexpected reward of managers.

The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between HC and CC. In contrast, the authors find that relational capital and SC have a positive impact on CC. The authors’ further analyses also demonstrate that disclosure of transactions with affiliates has a negative effect on unexpected rewards of managers.

Since there is no conducted study, which discusses the relationship between IC and contractual cost, this paper might be considered the primary studies conducted in this line of literature, specifically in emerging markets. Moreover, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study investigating the potential impact of disclosure of selling and purchasing transactions, separately, on the director's unexpected reward.